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Abstract 
Using dynamic GMM method with data from 2003 to 2015, we propose a growth hypothesis of capital structure of 
Chinese firms, that is, higher growth leads to higher financial leverage. The paper further investigates the impact of 
external financing constraints on the relationship of growth and leverage, and shows that the firm with tighter financing 
constraints has a stronger relation between growth and leverage. Finally, the robustness test is conducted in the 
high-tech industries with financial constraints and high growth. The conclusions of this paper have important 
implications for both the listed firms and the market regulators. 
Keywords: capital structure, financing constraints, growth, product market structure 
JEL Classification: G00 G32 
1. Introduction  
Modigliani and Miller’s theory suggests that under perfect market conditions, the choice of capital structure will not 
affect the value of the firm. In the subsequent literature, researchers have relaxed the perfect market hypothesis and 
accordingly, two other major theories emerge: the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory. Trade-off theory states 
that the firm will face a trade-off between the tax shield benefit and bankruptcy costs. Pecking order theory argues that, 
due to the existence of adverse selection, the firm will compare the costs occurred from different financing methods, 
and typically choose internal financing first, then debt financing, and finally equity financing. 
After nearly four decades’ reform and opening-up, China’s economy and its stock market now rank the second in the 
world, only after the United States. China’s A share has been included into the MSCI emerging market index, and the 
size of bank assets has become the largest in the world1. China’s financing system, and in particular the capital structure, 
however, is different from that of the developed countries.  
The factors that influence the capital structure of Chinese listed firms include firm characteristics, macroeconomic 
environment and industrial policies. The related literature is vast, for example see Huang and Song (2006), Zou and 
Xiao (2006), Strebulaer(2007), Qian et al.(2009), Pessarossi and Weill(2013), Chang et al.(2014), Danis et al.(2014), 
Dong et al. (2016), Huang et al. (2016), and Chen and Ling (2017)). Their main findings can be summarized in the 
following. First, the financial leverages are positive correlated with firm sizes while are negative correlated with profits. 
Second, financial leverages are positively correlated with the proportions of tangible asset. Third, because the 
state-owned firms have higher equity financing capacities, they generally display low financial leverages. Forth, 
different industries, different degrees of competition, different levels of economic development, different (bull or bear) 
market conditions or different monetary policies, may significantly affect the listed firm’s choice of financial leverage. 
As for the most important factors, Chang et al. (2014) pointed out that profitability and growth are crucial for the firm’s 
capital structure, and Zou and Xiao (2006) further argued that growth’s effect can also be analyzed with the trade-off 
theory or the pecking order theory. Trade-off theory suggests that higher growth means higher risk and higher financial 
cost, so the firm with higher growth tends to use more equity financing instead of riskier debt to alleviate this problem, 
therefore there is negative relationship of growth and financial leverage. Pecking order theory suggests that the firm 
with high growth faces stronger information asymmetry and chooses debt financing to countermeasure this asymmetry 
between outer investors and inner managers, so growth and financial leverage are positively correlated.  
                                                        
1 Data source: Financial Times, March 6, 2017. 
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Empirical studies yield mixed results. Tong and Green(2005)，Chang et al.(2014) and Danis and Rettl (2014), for 
example, found that growth is positively related to financial leverage, but Zou and Xiao (2006) and Hovey (2007) gave 
opposite conclusions. Huang and Song (2006) obtained both positive and negative correlations in their paper. The 
empirical results of Qian et al. (2009), however, showed that growth has no significant effect on financial leverage. 
Though previous studies did try to investigate the influence of growth on the capital structure of firms, most of them 
treat growth as exogenous without more detailed investigation. This paper tries to fix this problem, and thus is closely 
related to Gaur et al. (2013) and Jiang et al. (2015), in which firm growth is endogenously analyzed. The former is from 
the perspective of M&A, and the latter is from product market competition. Gaur et al. (2013) put forward the growth 
probability hypothesis, suggesting that China is an emerging market and thus Chinese firms have a huge growth 
opportunity. M&A is a strategic tool, not only for growth, but also for China’s stock market’s privatization. Besides, the 
Chinese government has an informal goal to let more Chinese firms to be listed into the “Global 500”. Therefore, 
whether horizontal or vertical, M&A can send a signal of the future potential growth.  
Jiang et al. (2015), on the other hand, argue that product competitiveness and investment are significantly correlated 
with each other under a high and predictable growth environment like China. According to the real option theory, when 
a project is not determined by the firm’s intrinsic characteristic, the waiting option devalues under the competition. 
China’s predictable high growth reduces the uncertainty of waiting option and accordingly, the value of it. Therefore, in 
order to pursue the first-mover advantage, the firm will choose immediate investment, resulting in a positive 
investment-competition correlation.  
We consider growth an important factor in influencing capital structure for Chinese firms for the following reason. The 
past four decades have witnessed burgeoning of China’s economy with average annual growth rate as high as 9.8%. In 
particularly, listed firms, which are generally leading firms in the industries, achieved even higher than average growth. 
This phenomenon is different with developed economies, in which the growth of listed firms is much lower or uncertain. 
We believe that in a predictable high growth economy, cost may not be the top concern when choosing financing. This 
paper indeed shows that the Chinese listed firms prefer debt with higher degree marketization than other options.  
Our contributions can be summarized in four aspects. First, according to Gaur et al. (2013) and Jiang et al. (2015), we 
propose the growth hypothesis of capital structure.  A firm compares the value between immediate investment and 
delayed investment. Because of the predictable high economic growth rate, value of immediate investment is higher and 
thus preferred in China. Furthermore, we compare the difference in the degree of marketization between the credit 
market and the stock market.  We find that Chinese firms prefer bank credits when the degree of marketization for 
external financing is higher. Therefore, we claim that the growth and financial leverage are positively correlated. 
Second, we investigate the relationships between growth, financial constraints, and capital structure in details. Firms 
need to decide equity financing or debt financing.  When choosing equity financing, the listed companies are faced 
with more difficulties such as the administrative intervention, the complexity of the procedure, and the long duration for 
approval. As a result, bank credit has become an important way of financing for listed companies. The differences in 
financing constraints largely refer to the easiness of accessing bank credit in China. This paper examines the impact of 
financing constraints on the relationship between capital structure and growth, and finds that when the financing 
constraints of listed companies are strong, even companies with high growth will have difficulties in obtaining the bank 
credit financing, which leads to a weakened relationship between capital structure and growth.  
Third, following the existing literature that analyze the effect of market competitiveness on company decision-making, 
we examine the impact of product competition on the relationship between capital structure and growth. The logic is 
that when the firm is facing a more competitive market environment, the first mover advantage is more significant and 
thus the firm prefers immediate financing regardless the cost, leading to a higher financial leverage. That is, product 
market competitiveness and capital structure are positively correlated. 
Fourth and the last, we use dynamic GMM model for empirical testing. Most researchers adopt the multiple 
cross-sectional regression models to study factors influencing the capital structure. However, as Barraclough (2007), 
Zhu (2012) and Chen (2014) has noted, this leads to false regression and may also cause endogeneity. In addition, this 
approach often uses the capital structure index as the financial leverage, which measures only the cumulative effect of 
historical financing decision, and thus cannot serve the purpose of analyzing a certain influencing factor well.  Wintoki 
et al. (2012), instead, proposes that the dynamic panel GMM model can better solve these problems.  Applying 
dynamic panel GMM model to test the capital structure of Chinese listed companies is still rare, and our study will 
enrich the related literature. 
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2. Institutional Background and Research Hypotheses 
2.1 Institutional Background 
2.1.1 Debt Financing 
As a transitional economy, China has unique institutional characteristics, which significantly differ from other countries 
in terms of degree of marketization, ownership structure of financial institutions, government regulation and other 
aspects.  
Since China’s reform and opening-up policy, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) has divested its commercial bank 
functions, policy bank functions and monitoring functions to other banks to focus on central bank functions. Following 
this shift, a banking system with five state-owned commercial banks at the core, and supplemented by national 
joint-stock commercial banks, regional city commercial banks, rural credit cooperatives and foreign banks has gradually 
taken shape. Because China had been a planned economy (instead of the market economy) before, there were some 
innate problems such as regional and industrial segmentation and serious administrative intervention from the 
government.   
The entry of WTO urged China to reform its banking system. As a price paid for being a new member of WTO, China 
committed itself to fully open the banking sector to foreign-invested banks after five years of protection period as of 
2011. To prepare for this competition, China’s commercial banks had already accelerated their reform. “Law on 
Operation of Commercial Banks” in 1995 requires commercial banks to strengthen their credit risk management, 
gradually reduce or even stop loans to uncompetitive state-owned enterprises (SOEs) upon the administrative order of 
the government. The effects of this law were impressive (Li, 2011).  
Apart from legislation, China has also turned to other measures to reform its banking system, including capital injection 
for state-owned enterprises, establishment of a special monitoring institution, implementation of new accounting 
standards, and reduction of state-owned share-holding. Central Hujin Investment Ltd. was founded in 2003 and it 
injected foreign exchange reserves into four state-owned commercial banks, including 22.5 billion USD into the Bank 
of China (BOC) in October 2003, 20 billion USD into China Construction Bank (CCB) in December 2003, 15 billion 
USD into the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) in April, and 19 billion USD into the Bank of 
Agriculture (BOA) in November 2008.  
April 25, 2003 witnessed the establishment of China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), which is a 
ministry-level institution directly subordinate to the State Council. Authorized by the State Council, the CBRC was 
responsible for monitoring and managing banks, financial asset management companies, trust investment companies 
and other deposit-type financial institutions; and maintaining legitimate and steady operation of the banking industry. 
The goal of CBRC was to strengthen the monitoring role and improve the overall competitiveness of domestic banks.  
On January 1, 2007, “New Version of Accounting System for Business Enterprises” was put into force. Definitions of 
accounting items in the new system are geared to the international practices. Not only does the “New Version of 
Accounting System for Business Firm” bring dramatic changes to accounting, but also it lifts risk control, information, 
disclosure, information system and corporate governance of commercial banks to a new level.  
Foreign investors or banks are only allowed to hold a small percentage of state-owned shares. In 2005, the Bank of 
America and Temasek Holdings invested 3 billion USD and 2.5 billion USD to hold 9% and 6% of the China 
Construction Bank (CCB) respectively. Following that, China started to turn its banks from pure state-owned into public 
holding entities through listing on the A share market of Mainland China and on Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing 
Limited (HKEx). On October 27, 2005, the CCB went public on HKEx, and then issued A-shares on September 25, 
2007. On June 1, 2016, and July 5, 2006, Bank of China(BOA) Limited successfully listed itself in HKEx and Shanghai 
Stock Exchange (SSE), subsequently. On October 28, 2006, CBRC synchronously listed itself in HKEx and SSE. On 
July 15, 2010 and July 16, the BOA listed itself on HKEx and SSE, respectively. The reforms of banking sector are 
widely regarded to be positive. For example, Chang et al. (2014), Hsiao et al. (2015), Qian et al. (2015) and Dong et al. 
(2016) studied China’s banking sector from the perspective of cost and profitability, credit rating, professionalism of 
staff, and concluded that the reform of China’s banking industry has achieved a huge success.  
China’s informal financial institutions also provides capital for firms, especially for small and medium-sized firms 
(SMEs). Credit guarantee is more widely adopted by informal financial institutions instead of mortgage guarantee, 
which is often adopted by formal financial institutions like banks. This turns out to be an important source of financing 
for SMES. For example, a survey of 110 SMEs from 20 provinces indicates that the informal financing accounted for 
28.07% of total financing. Dybvig et al. (2011) showed that there had been 15,000 informal financial institutions by the 
end of 2010, which provided 893 billion RMB of loans for 166,000 firms. To better regulate the informal financing, in 
2006, the PBOC issued “Regulations on Lenders” to further specify the identities of lenders, borrowers and range of the 
interest rates. According to Economic Information Daily on September 22, 2014, the private lending and financing in 
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China had exceeded 500 million RMB. 
2.1.2 Equity Financing 
Compared with debt financing, the progress of China’s equity financing is deliberately made slow and the government 
gives direct controls over almost every aspect of the market. On March 17, 1999, CSRC issued “Several Opinions on 
Further Strengthening Monitoring of Security Firms”, requiring that any firm planning to increase shares must be 
earning profit. This requirement was underlined again in the “Interim Procedures for Listed Firms on Public Offerings” 
on April 30, 2000. On March 28, 2001, “Regulations for Offering of New Shares by Listed Firms” further required 
listed firms to distribute dividends. If the listed firms fail to do so, the main underwriter should disclose this in the due 
diligence report. 
On December 8, 2004, “Several Regulations on Strengthening Protection of Rights and Interests of Public Stock 
Shareholders” clearly stipulated that listed firms that have not distributed cash dividends are neither eligible to issue 
new shares among the public, nor issue convertible bonds or provide placing for original shareholders. “Policies on 
dividends for Listed Firms” released on May 6, 2006 specified dividends including cash in more details. “Modifications 
of Several Regulations on Dividends of Listed Firms” issued on October 9, 2008 amended the year 2006 version and 
formally required that cash dividends should be cash only, and further raised the ratio of cash in total dividends. In 
particular, it requires that “the cash dividends in the most recent three years should not be lower than 30% of the annual 
average distributable profits realized in the most recent three years”.  
CSRC also oversees the allotment and seasoned equity offer(SEO) process. According to “Management Methods on 
Security Offering of Listed Firms” and “Notice on New Equity Offering for Listed Firms”, only firms that have profits 
can use equity financing, and even when their equity financing application are approved, they cannot choose the 
allotment price and allotment offering quantity.  CSRC stipulates detailed requirements on profitability, SEO price, 
SEO interval and lockup period through frequent orders, policies, or notices. There documents have one thing in 
common, that is, to limit the size of SEO shares.  
Various studies have confirmed that the government regulations are hindering China’s equity market.  For example, Bo 
et al. (2011) finds that SEO of listed firms on China’s stock market is influenced by administrative intervention not only 
in terms of the equity offering process, but also in terms of the equity offering pricing. Fonseka et al. (2014) studies 
private placement regulations issued by CSRC in 2006, and points that these regulations allow CSRC to play a greater 
role in intervention. Fonseka et al. (2015) focus on political ties for listed firms and argued that firms with strong 
political ties, which are typical for SOEs, can get approval from CSRC easier and faster. 
In short, the reform process of China’s debt financing market and equity financing market is unbalanced. China’s debt 
market is more market orientated, but the equity market is subject to strong government regulations.  To get the 
regulation approvals, firms must wait longer or have strong political ties to expedite this process. The strong regulations 
bring about additional costs for listed firms when considering equity financing.   
2.2 Research Hypotheses 
Traditionally, growths of firms are taken as control variables when studying the capital structure. Growth means 
valuable investment projects in the future, although it lacks guarantee value because of the future uncertainty.  Once a 
firm cannot keep on operation and loses the growth momentum, it will have to endure the high financial distress cost 
(Myers, 1977).  According to the trade-off theory, the debt level and the growth are negatively correlated. In part, this 
is because when the firm’s growth is higher, insiders who have private information are not willing to share the earnings 
with outsider creditors. Consequently, the debt ratio tends to fall. Besides, Kim and Welsbach (2008) argue that the 
high-growth firm has a more uncertain cash flow and its information asymmetry is thus more serious. This requires the 
firm to choose equity financing to avoid financial distress in the future. Empirical findings of Rajan and Zingales(1995) 
and Booth et al.(2001) have supported the negative correlation between growth and capital structure. 
This conclusion, however, may hold only for market with modest growth. For emerging economies like China, high 
growth is more likely and thus uncertainty is considered much lesser. According to real options theory, a firm can 
compare the value of immediate investment and prolonged investment. When the latter is higher than the former, the 
firm should wait for the next round when the economic situation improves; otherwise, the firm should invest 
immediately. The rapid growth of China’s economy has created a favorable external environment for Chinese firms. 
Because of high predictability of growth, future growth is more certain2. Hence, high-growth firms should take the 
                                                        
2 According to the world bank database, during 2003-2015, the annual growth rate of China’s GDP is 9.43%, the 
standard deviation is 2.13%, standard deviation/mean is 0.226, the annual growth rate of world’s GDP is 2.89%, the 
standard deviation is 1.63%, standard deviation/mean is 0.566, the annual growth rate of OECD’s GDP is 1.73%, the 
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immediate investment strategy to increase their value. 
There are two financing approaches for Chinese listed firms: debt financing and equity financing. If the listed firm’s 
growth is high and there are many investment opportunities with predictable value, then the listed firm will make use of 
all financing opportunities to expand the market share first.  This suggests that Chinese firms may still prefer debt for 
fast financing even the cost is high.  In developed equity markets where government intervention is rare and the 
associated waiting time is not long, firms will compare equity financing with debt financing and choose the less costly 
one, according to the pecking order theory.  
The bond market of Chinese firms has not yet been fully developed, and debt financing is dominated by bank loans. 
Besides, China’s bank loans adopt the credit rating method, which can facilitate the listed firms in obtaining loans 
(Chang et al., 2014). This credit rating system is beneficial for high-growth firms. On the contrary, China’s capital 
market has long implemented strict regulation, and the regulations for equity refinancing of listed firms have not shown 
any sign to loose. Though China’s equity financing cost is low because of its higher price/earnings(PE), financing 
demands of high-growth listed firms can hardly be met in a timely manner because of the strict regulations. 
Therefore, we propose the following main hypotheses: 
H1: The higher the firm’s growth, the higher the financial leverage for Chinese listed firms. 
External financing of a listed firm will be confronted with different degrees of financing constraints, which are common 
for Chinese listed firms. When the financing constraints are tight, listed firms will have more difficulties in equity 
financing from the capital market. As a result, firms with tighter financing constraints will prefer debt financing and 
thus have high the financial leverages. Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses: 
H2: Firms with tighter financing constraints have a stronger correlation between capital structure and growth. 
According to the theory of industrial organization, firms take the response of competitors into their own 
decision-making. For example, see James and Levis (1986), Wanzenried (2000), Lyandres (2002) and Liu Zhibiao et al. 
(2003) for theoretical research and Guney et al. (2011), Mitani (2014) for empirical research, who argue that the 
corporate financial structure depends on the characteristics of the company's specific product market (such as Cournot 
competition, Bochuan competition and duopoly competition). The higher market competition, the higher return is for 
first move advantage. This implies that when the market is more competitive, the immediate investment (debt financing) 
is more valuable and thus preferred, and the financial cost will be less likely to be considered. Therefore, we have the 
following hypothesis. 
H3: The more competitive industry, the higher correlation between firm growth and financial leverage.  
3. Empirical Model and Data  
Since debt is a continuous variable, we use dynamic GMM method to test the effect of growth on capital structure with 
controlling both time effect and industry effect. Also, because of the possible endogeneity between capital structure and 
growth, we adjust by subtracting the industry averages. Based on the hypothesis, we develop the following three 
empirical models: 
, 1 , 1 2 , 3 , ,i t i t i t i t t k i t
j k
Lev Lev R X Year Industry                                       (3.1) 
, 1 , 1 2 , 3 , 4 , , 5 , ,*i t i t i t i t i t i t i t t k i t
j k
Lev Lev R I R I X Year Industry                     (3.2) 
, 1 , 1 2 , 3 , 4 , , 5 , ,*i t i t i t i t i t i t i t t i t
j
Lev Lev R HHI R HHI X Year                        (3.3) 
where Levi,t is the financial leverage(capital-debt ratio) to represent capital structure. R stands for firm’s growth, which 
can be represented by the growth rate of business revenue and TQ. In the robustness test, R is changed to the national or 
provincial economic growth rate. X are control variables including firm size “Size”, shareholder’s “concentration”, 
firm’s tax rate “Taxrate”, non-debt tax shield “Ndts”, and tangible asset ratio “Tangas”. “Year” stands for dummy 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
standard deviation is 1.76%, standard deviation/mean is 1.017. So, the growth and stability of Chinese economy are 
much higher than the world average level and those of developed countries. 
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variables of different years and “Industry” represents the dummy of different industries with subscript “I” represents the 
company I and “t” represents year t.   
The financial constraints are represented by three indicators3: the ownership of the firm (state owned or not), the KZ 
index and the firm size. When the main stakeholder of the company is non-state, the KZ index is lower than the industry 
average and the firm's scale is lower than the industry average, the firm is assumed to face financial constraints, and the 
three financing constraints dummy variable are assigned 1.  The HHI index is used to measure the Hertindahl 
Himchman Index, that is  iHHI OR OR , in which
iOR OR ，representing the main business income of 
the firm. The smaller the HHI index, the stronger is the market competition. Control variables were taken from the firm 
size, non-debt tax shield, asset yield, the proportion of tangible assets, the proportion of large shareholders and tax rates. 
Table1 summarizes the description of all variables.  
 
Table 1. Variable definition 
Variable Name Acronym Definition 
dependent  
variable  
Capital leverage Lev Total liabilities over total assets 
independent  
variable 
Firm growth 
Growth Current operating income over operating income for the previous year -1 
TQ 
(Book value of liabilities+ Market value of shareholders' equity)÷Book value of 
total assets 
Country growth Sgdp National GDP growth rate 
Province growth Pgdp The GDP growth rate of the province where the firm is registered. 
Financing constraint Rz 
The actual control of the firm is state-owned Rz1=0,or Rz1=1 
Firm pay individends Rz2=0,or Rz2=1 
According to the Kz index (Kaplan ＆ Zingales，1997), 
When over the average of industry，Rz3=0,or Rz3=1 
Firm size over the average of industry，Rz4=0,or Rz4=1 
 
product market 
structure 
HHI 
 iHHI OR OR ,where ORi representing the main business income of the 
firm 
control 
variable 
Firm size Size Natural logarithm of total assets of the firm 
Non debt tax shield Ndts Depreciation over total assets 
return on assets Roa Operating profit over total assets 
Tangible assets ratio Tangas Net fixed assets over total assets 
The proportion of 
large shareholders 
First The proportion of the largest shareholder 
tax rate Taxrate The actual tax rate of firm 
 
                                                        
3 According to Kaplan ＆ Zingales(1997), the index to measure financing constraint also includes whether paying  
cash dividends. This paper does not add this measurement, because Chinese listed companies which pay cash dividends 
are not widespread, and paying cash dividends is regarded as debt financing. This paper uses the difficulties of bank 
credit financing to measure the difference of financing constraint of Chinese listed companies. 
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This financial data are from the RESSET database, and the national GDP growth rate and provincial GDP growth rate 
are from the National Statistical Yearbook. The sample of this paper is the non-financial listed companies in China's 
A-share market. We take 2003 as the starting year because all listed firms’ actual controllers were required to be 
disclosed since then. The ending year is 2015. All data are Winsor processed ([1%, 99%]) to treat extreme values. The 
statistical descriptions of the variables are shown in Table 2.  
As can be seen from Table 2, the variable financial leverage, “Lev”, is higher than that of the US firm’s average (Danis 
et al., 2014) , which reflects that the indirect financing, for example, bank loan, is more common for Chinese firms. The 
variable “GDP” indicates that the growth rates are high, whether in the national level(Sgdp) or provincial level(Pgdp). 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics 
Variables Lev Growth TQ Sgdp Pgdp HHI 
mean 0.483 0.219 2.016 9.397 10.979 0.112 
p25 0.484 0.123 1.380 9.5 11 0.072 
p50 0.317 -0.029 0.776 7.8 8.5 0.048 
p75 0.635 0.305 2.454 10.6 13 0.126 
sd 0.228 0.611 2.007 1.994 2.729 0.126 
N 17595 17595 17595 17595 17595 17595 
Variables Size Ndts Roa Tangas First Taxrate 
mean 21.688 0.023 0.030 0.267 37.257 0.217 
p25 21.545 0.020 0.032 0.235 35.19 0.25 
p50 20.833 0.011 0.010 0.122 24.86 0.15 
p75 22.368 0.032 0.060 0.384 49.12 0.25 
sd 1.242 0.016 0.068 0.183 15.731 0.069 
N 17595 17595 17595 17595 17595 17595 
 
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation test results for each variable. As can be seen, the correlation coefficients 
between dependent variable (here△Lev) and independent variables (Growth, TQ, Sgdp and Pgdp) are all significant 
positive which mean that hypothesize 1 holds.  Also, except Ndts and Tangas, the correlation coefficients between the 
variables are small, implying that collinearity may not be a serious problem in the regression analysis. In order to get 
more accurate test, new empirical tests include all control variables will be conducted in the latter part of this paper. 
 
Table 3. Correlation matrix 
  Lev △Lev Growth TQ Sgdp Pgdp Size Ndts  Roa Tangas First 
△Lev 
0.44*** 
(0.00)            
Growth 
0.16*** 
(0.00) 
0.17*** 
(0.00)          
TQ 
0.06*** 
(0.00) 
0.09*** 
(0.00) 
0.07*** 
(0.00)         
Sgdp 
-0.29*** 
(0.00) 
0.07*** 
(0.00) 
-0.05*** 
(0.00) 
-0.01  
(0.44)        
Pgdp 
-0.15*** 
(0.00) 
0.04*** 
(0.00) 
-0.02** 
(0.02) 
0.04*** 
(0.00) 
0.74*** 
(0.00)       
Size 
0.21*** 
(0.00) 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
-0.35*** 
(0.00) 
-0.19*** 
(0.00)  
-0.18*** 
(0.00)       
Ndts 
-0.28*** 
(0.00) 
-0.09*** 
(0.00) 
0.05*** 
(0.00) 
0.09*** 
(0.00) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
-0.04*** 
(0.00)  
0.10*** 
(0.00) 
-0.14*** 
(0.00) 
  
 
Roa 
0.06*** 
(0.00) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
0.12*** 
(0.00) 
-0.03*** 
(0.00) 
0.12*** 
(0.00) 
0.12*** 
(0.00) 
0.04*** 
(0.00)     
Tangas 
0.07*** 
(0.00) 
-0.03*** 
(0.00)  
0.14*** 
(0.00) 
-0.04***  
(0.00) 
0.15*** 
(0.00)  
0.17*** 
(0.00)  
0.09*** 
(0.00) 
0.77 *** 
(0.00) 
-0.13*** 
(0.00)   
First 
-0.01 
(0.12)  
-0.01** 
(0.05) 
0.00  
(0.71) 
-0.01* 
(0.06)  
0.05*** 
(0.00)  
0.04*** 
(0.00)  
0.23*** 
(0.00) 
0.09*** 
(0.00)  
0.12*** 
(0.00)  
0.08*** 
(0.00) 
  
Taxrate 
0.01** 
(0.04)  
-0.04*** 
(0.00) 
-0.07*** 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.16) 
0.28*** 
(0.00) 
0.22*** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.62) 
0.10*** 
(0.00) 
-0.10*** 
(0.00) 
0.14*** 
(0.00) 
0.04*** 
(0.00) 
This table reports the correlations matrix of the variables used in our analyses. △Lev is defined as leverage min lag one 
period of leverage. 
Numbers in parentheses are probabilities. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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4. Empirical Results 
4.1 The Effect of Growth to Capital Structure 
Table 4 is the results for empirical test of hypothesis H1 as the regression model (3.1). The first “(1) and (2)” columns 
of Table 4 are the main empirical results. We use the firm's revenue growth rate and the Tobin Q value test respectively. 
The results show that the regression coefficients of both growth and TQ values are significant positive (at 1% level), 
implying that the higher the company's growth, the higher the financial leverage. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 are the 
robustness tests for the study hypothesis H1, in which national GDP (SGDP) and provincial GDP (PGDP) are included, 
respectively.  
The results show that the regression coefficients of the growth variables are positive, and the regression coefficients of 
the national GDP growth rate are tested by 1% significance level. The regression coefficient of the provincial GDP 
growth rate is through the 5% significance level. Therefore, the hypothesis H1 is supported. This indicates that the 
optimal investment strategy is to invest immediately, rather than to wait. But the degree of marketization of the debt and 
equity markets is different, and the company is more likely to be able to obtain the bank credit-based bond financing, 
which led to increased financial leverage. 
Of the control variables, the coefficient for “size” is significantly positive. According to the trade-off theory, the larger 
the firm is, the lower is the probability of incurring financial distress, and thus the higher is the financial leverage. The 
profitability of the firm's Roa regression is tested to be significantly negative, indicating that firms with higher profit 
will use internal resources first when financing. The coefficient with tangible asset, “Tangas”, is significantly positive, 
implying that the firm's guarantee value is higher with bigger proportion of tangible assets, and thus easier to borrow, 
leading to a higher financial leverage eventually. 
 
Table 4. The effect of growth to capital structure for Chinese listed firm 
 Lev (1) (2) (3)  (4)  
_cons 
-0.511 
(-0.92) 
-2.832*** 
(-7.75) 
-0.990*** 
(-3.86) 
-0.980*** 
(-3.83) 
L.Lev 
0.193*** 
(9.65) 
0.146*** 
(8.93) 
0.776*** 
(19.49) 
0.766*** 
(19.62) 
growth 
0.013*** 
(11.60) 
   
TQ  
0.052*** 
(15.44) 
  
Sgdp   
0.007*** 
(5.26) 
 
Pgdp    
0.002** 
(2.02) 
Size 
0.051*** 
(3.82) 
0.101*** 
(6.82) 
0.053*** 
(5.81) 
0.055*** 
(5.90) 
Roa 
-0.705*** 
(-11.81) 
-0.661*** 
(-13.48) 
-0.892*** 
(-22.28) 
-0.908*** 
(-22.00) 
Ndts 
0.171 
(0.28) 
-0.514 
(-0.97) 
-0.473 
(-1.32) 
-0.557 
(-1.60) 
Tangas 
0.238*** 
(4.66) 
0.177*** 
(3.82) 
0.068*** 
(2.65) 
0.075*** 
(2.96) 
First 
-0.001 
(-1.12) 
0.001 
(0.17) 
0.001** 
(2.08) 
0.001** 
(2.16) 
Taxrate 
-0.012 
(-0.16) 
-0.022 
(-0.32) 
0.042 
(1.43) 
0.032 
(1.11) 
Year fixed Effect controlled controlled controlled controlled 
Industry fixed Effect controlled controlled controlled controlled 
AR(1) 0.051 0.024 0.031 0.018 
AR(2) 0.221 0.121 0.282 0.173 
Sargan 0.432 0.547 0.631 0.531 
Obs 17595 17595 17595 17595 
The number in parentheses is Z .***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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4.2 The Effect of Financing Constraints on the Relation of Growth and Capital Structure 
Table 5 is the regression result of testing H2, in which column (1) and (2) use the nature of actual controller to represent 
financing constraints. Only non-state owned listed firms are assumed to face financing constraints, and takes 1; state 
owned listed firms take the value of 0. Column (3) and (4) consider KZ index, with the assumption that the higher KZ, 
the tighter constraints. Rz2 takes value 1 if KZ is above average and 0 otherwise. Column (5) and (6) take “size” into 
account, and assume that smaller firms face tighter constraints. Thus, it takes 1 if the size of the firm is smaller than the 
average size and 0 otherwise.   
Table 5 shows that the coefficients for the entire cross terms except column (4) and (5) are negative (exceeding the 1% 
significance level). This means that the tighter financing constraints the firm faces, the higher growth and higher 
leverage the firm tends to have. That is, the firm with stronger financing constraints has a stronger positive effect on the 
correlation between capital structure and growth. Hypothesis H2 is supported. Furthermore, the results show that, when 
high growth firms face tighter financing constraints, their debt will be lower not only because of the high revenue 
growth, but also because of the difficulty of obtaining external debt. Moreover, GROWTH and TQ are tested at 1% 
significance level and further support hypothesis H1 . 
 
Table 5. The effect of financing constraints on the relation of growth and capital structure 
Lev (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
_cons 
-1.230** 
(-2.18) 
-2.083*** 
(-6.00) 
-0.707* 
(-1.65) 
-1.481*** 
(-4.30) 
-1.006* 
(-1.72) 
-1.630*** 
(-4.23) 
L.Lev 
0.188*** 
(9.17) 
0.145*** 
(8.53) 
0.166*** 
(8.80) 
0.127*** 
(8.33) 
0.185*** 
(9.21) 
0.136*** 
(8.44) 
Growth 
0.018*** 
(8.61) 
 
0.044*** 
(6.94) 
 
0.012*** 
(9.23) 
 
TQ  
0.071*** 
(15.72) 
 
0.053*** 
(13.92) 
 
0.069*** 
(16.01) 
Rz1 
-0.010 
(-0.38) 
0.009 
(0.32) 
    
Growth*Rz1 
-0.009*** 
(-3.68) 
     
TQ*Rz1  
-0.030*** 
(-5.93) 
    
Rz2   
0.066*** 
(8.41) 
0.070*** 
(8.80) 
  
Growth*Rz2   
-0.036*** 
(-5.63) 
   
TQ*Rz2    
-0.004 
(-0.93) 
  
Rz3     
-0.005 
(-0.35) 
0.004 
(0.30) 
Growth*Rz3     
0.003 
(1.37) 
 
TQ*Rz3      
-0.024*** 
(-5.17) 
Size 
0.053*** 
(4.07) 
0.100*** 
(6.80) 
0.022* 
(1.78) 
0.095*** 
(6.57) 
0.042*** 
(2.82) 
0.106*** 
(6.67) 
Roa 
-0.691*** 
(-12.27) 
-0.646*** 
(-13.34) 
-0.647*** 
(-12.32) 
-0.578*** 
(-12.10) 
-0.687*** 
(-11.99) 
-0.649*** 
(-13.25) 
Ndts 
-0.112 
(-0.18) 
-0.743 
(-1.38) 
-0.456 
(-0.77) 
-0.698 
(-1.38) 
-0.034 
(-0.05) 
-0.438 
(-0.82) 
Tangas 
0.233*** 
(4.39) 
0.169*** 
(3.61) 
0.347*** 
(6.55) 
0.267*** 
(5.56) 
0.237*** 
(4.48) 
0.173*** 
(3.79) 
First 
-0.001 
(-0.98) 
0.000 
(0.28) 
-0.001 
(-1.45) 
-0.000 
(-0.21) 
-0.001 
(-1.03) 
0.000 
(-0.11) 
Taxrate 
-0.011 
(-0.15) 
-0.025 
(-0.37) 
-0.021 
(-0.29) 
-0.018 
(-0.27) 
-0.018 
(-0.24) 
-0.032 
(-0.47) 
Year fixed Effect controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled 
Industry fixed Effect controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled 
AR(1) 0.009 0.014 0.021 0.036 0.023 0.032 
AR(2) 0.324 0.453 0.489 0.524 0.529 0.615 
Sargan 0.524 0.653 0.589 0.624 0.632 0.745 
Obs 17595 17595 17595 17595 17595 17595 
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The number in parentheses is Z .***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
4.3 The Effect of Product Market Structure on the Relation of Growth and Capital Structure 
Table 6 is the empirical tests of the hypothesis H3, or equation (3.3). As can be seen from Table 6, the cross products of 
the two growth indicators and product market structure indicators are significantly negative (at the 5% significance 
level of), indicating that when the industry is more competitive, that is, with smaller HHI index, and higher growth, the 
firm tends to have higher leverage. Therefore, hypothesis H3 is also supported. The reason is that the high growth firms 
face stronger competition, and thus have stronger desire to invest immediately to gain the first mover advantage. 
Therefore, when facing equity financing constraints, the firms prefer the debt financing, which is of higher degree of 
marketization, and this will result in a higher financial leverage. Similarly, both Growth and TQ of Table 5 yielded a 1% 
significance level, implying that H1 is again supported. 
 
Table 6. The effect of product market structure on the relation of growth and capital structure 
Lev (1) (2) 
_cons 
-1.133*** 
(-4.13) 
-3.080*** 
(-10.53) 
L.Lev 
0.184*** 
(9.93) 
0.139*** 
(9.11) 
Growth 
0.015*** 
(9.91) 
 
TQ  
0.056*** 
(15.74) 
HHI 
-0.110** 
(-2.23) 
-0.058 
(-1.08) 
Growth* HHI 
-0.017** 
(-2.28) 
 
TQ* HHI  
-0.035** 
(-2.34) 
Size 
0.051*** 
(3.99) 
0.109*** 
(7.98) 
Roa 
-0.715*** 
(-12.72) 
-0.656*** 
(-12.66) 
Ndts 
-0.419 
(-0.74) 
-0.276 
(-0.52) 
Tangas 
0.248*** 
(5.29) 
0.165*** 
(3.62) 
First 
-0.001 
(-1.41) 
-0.000 
(-0.01) 
Taxrate 
-0.044 
(-0.60) 
-0.033 
(-0.48) 
Year fixed Effect controlled controlled 
AR(1) 0.002 0.010 
AR(2) 0.374 0.514 
Sargan 0.538 0.631 
Obs 17595 17595 
The number in parentheses is Z .***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
 
4.4 Growth and Capital Structure for High-Tech Firms 
For robustness check, we select the high-tech firms because of their higher growth, lower proportion of tangible assets, 
and stronger financing constraints. In particular, we select out the 417 firms either in medicine and biological products 
sector (C8) or information technology sector (G). Table 7 shows the empirical results of the relationship between the 
growth and capital structure for these firms. It can be seen that the regression coefficients of both the growth and TQ 
values of both growth indices are positive and pass the 1% significance level test, strongly indicating that he stronger 
the growth, the higher the company's financial leverage. 
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Table 7. Growth and capital structure for high-tech firms 
Lev Growth TQ 
_cons 
-1.502** 
(-2.40) 
-3.321*** 
(-4.70) 
L.Lev 
0.330*** 
(7.16) 
0.262*** 
(6.87) 
Growth 
0.020*** 
(3.10) 
 
TQ  
0.022*** 
(6.08) 
Size 
0.032 
(1.17) 
0.111*** 
(3.48) 
Roa 
-0.441*** 
(-3.10) 
-0.389** 
(-2.25) 
Ndts 
1.671 
(0.76) 
3.691 
(1.60) 
Tangas 
0.170 
(1.06) 
0.012 
(0.07) 
First 
-0.005** 
(-2.12) 
-0.002 
(-0.88) 
Taxrate 
0.199 
(1.28) 
0.238 
(1.63) 
Year fixed Effect controlled controlled 
AR(1) 0.015 0.032 
AR(2) 0.241 0.325 
Sargan 0.477 0.521 
Obs 2212 2212 
The number in parentheses is Z .***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
 
5. Conclusion 
As an emerging economy, China’s growth is relatively higher, which creates a predictable steady growth environment 
for Chinese firms. Thus, Chinese firms prefer immediate investment rather than delayed investment. Meanwhile, the 
marketization process of China’s bank credit leads ahead of the stock market. Therefore, Chinese listed firms generally 
have high financial leverage, and the financial leverage and the growth are positively correlated. When a listed firm is 
faced with financial constraints, or in a more competitive product market, the positive correlation between its growth 
and its financial leverage becomes even stronger. The robustness check, in which part the high-tech industries are 
concentrated, supports the above hypothesis.  
Not only the results can be helpful for the listed firms, for example, firms with high competition should focus on the 
timing, not the cost, to take the first mover advantage; but also the research findings of this paper can serve as policy 
guidance for Chinese financial authorities. Since China’s stock market lags behind in terms of its marketization process, 
the authority should let the market play a bigger role, instead of relying on the lengthy administration process, to 
shorten the financing duration. 
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